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Abstract 
South Africa’s peace and security outlook in the EU-SA Strategic Partnership has been 
guided by the content and substance of the founding document, which incorporates an 
interdependent approach to development. For South Africa, engagement in the EU-SA 
Strategic Partnership is framed by its historical background, its identity and the content 
of its foreign policy. South Africa’s foreign policy in particular adopts an integrated 
approach to securing the state within its surrounding regional and continental 
geography. This article reviews South Africa’s approach to peace and security, in the 
context of the strategic partnership. The article argues that, overall, South Africa’s 
definition of peace and security is compatible with that of the EU, however, Pretoria’s 
vision of how it provides peace and security has naturally changed in line with the 
varying international circumstances in which it has found itself. While this has proved 
difficult at times to reconcile peace and security collaboration in the strategic 
partnership has managed to remain intact.  
Key words: EU, South Africa, strategic partnership, peace, security 
Introduction 
South Africa’s outlook, and in particular its peace and security outlook – including its 
part in the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership – is underpinned by the country’s 
apartheid  past, and aims to realise the democratic foundational principles. In view of 
these factors, many believe that South Africa holds a peerless position on the continent 
and in the wider international community, deemed to possess a significant reservoir of 
moral capital and destined for leadership. South Africa’s mantle of peacemaker, 
reconciler, and mediator create an intrinsic and exceptional capital. These roles inform 
South Africa’s foreign policy approach, which includes an approach to peace and 
security incorporating sustainable socio-economic development. To have an agenda 
greater than itself would seem, as one South African scholar has pointed out, inherent 
‘in its DNA’.1 
Pretoria’s confronting issues of peace and security externally has thus been based on 
the realisation that South Africa’s own stability and long-term security is dependent on 
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the degree to which stability and security are found in its surrounding region and on the 
wider continent, indeed, throughout the global ‘South’. This approach is best expressed 
in documents outlining the African Agenda and the diplomacy of Ubuntu2.  
It is the awareness of its position as a ‘new’ democracy, and its location at the southern 
tip of Africa, that informs its approach to peace and security.   
It should be noted from the outset that peace and security is incorporated into the EU-
South Africa Strategic Partnership (EU-SA SP) through development cooperation and 
on science and technology innovation. However, this article will focus on reviewing 
South Africa’s peace and security within the strategic partnership overall. Based on this 
review, it is contended that South Africa uses its intrinsic moral capital as outlined 
above, and designs its foreign policy strategic objectives in a fluid or adaptive manner 
to increase peace and security and hence the strategic capital of the partnership. It is, 
this article argues, this adaptive quality that has of late maintained the currency of the 
EU-SA SP as it stands.  
It is further argued that while there is still agreement on what constitutes peace and 
security for South Africa in Africa, and that Pretoria still remains key to the strategic 
aspect of the peace and security part of the partnership, significant differences exist 
between the partners about the means by which peace and security will be delivered.  
For South Africa, forging demonstrably tighter solidarity with its African counterparts 
has become a major part of its strategic approach in foreign policy including that of its 
peace and security.  While the partnership was begun during President Thabo Mbeki’s 
tenure in 2007, it has under the presidency of Jacob Zuma since 2009 become radically 
re-aligned to emphasise African solidarity and the ‘South’, especially post-20133. South 
Africa’s emphasis on delivering an African peace and security is then central to the 
observed divergence of interests articulated more recently in media and press coverage. 
What has been referred to as indecisive or contradictory behaviour by South Africa in 
its international relations – and this includes in its peace and security approach within 
the EU-SA SP – is better observed to be an adaptive modality based on changing 
situational circumstances and the perception of values and interests at a particular time. 
This makes South Africa particularly difficult to rely on as a ‘predictable’ (and 
moreover controllable) partner, resulting in the remonstrations from the EU  
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An empirical approach has been used in the review of South Africa’s peace and security 
approach in the EU-SA SP, one which employed both primary and secondary sources 
of information. Consultations with officials and representatives of South Africa’s 
Department of International Affairs and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the EU delegation 
in Pretoria, past and present, were conducted. The interviews were unstructured and 
non-attributable. Material from the interviews have been used in the analysis.  
Online and print media were consulted, as well as specialised literature on the EU-SA 
SP. This article reviews the areas of peace and security identified in the Joint Action 
Plan (JAP) of 2007, the specific areas covered during summits between 2008 and 2013 
(the last summit held), and also the peace and security projects (hard militaristic 
cooperation on the continent is excluded by the terms of the SP) under the Dialogue 
Facility of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA-F) between 
the EU and South Africa which have remained active. 
The article proceeds with a section outlining South Africa’s outlook on peace and 
security, as it has evolved through and as part of its foreign policy. From there, South 
Africa’s peace and security role in the partnership is reviewed, and it is proposed that 
both the EU and South Africa have vested interests in supporting a strong South African 
role in the African Agenda.  
The next section focuses on peace and security discussions between the two partners as 
recorded at the annual summits and in joint communiques from the ministerial troika 
meetings that have taken place.4 The areas under peace and security deemed most 
contentious between the EU and South Africa, as seen in media coverage, interviews, 
and special presentations made in the South African community by EU officials, have 
been identified as the following:  Libya, Zimbabwe, and the Sudan (including the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)/al-Bashir issue).  Interactions over these issues will 
be reviewed in light of their influence on the dynamics of peace and security in the SP. 
These three cases illustrate how human rights have become a central and securitised 
element of peace and security cooperation in the EU-SA SP.  
Discussion will also look at the areas listed by the Dialogue Facility5 as peace and 
security projects, and as such matters of active collaboration between the EU and South 
Africa. These are the Kimberley Process (KP), and the Trilateral Peace and Security 
Project.6  Both the Kimberly Process and the Trilateral Peace and Security Project are 
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frameworks to establish and build communication between the EU and South Africa. 
Specifically, the Trilateral Peace and Security Project establishes organised 
(regularised) communication between the Presidency, the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the EU through which peace and security 
matters can be discussed, which importantly and specifically involves non-state actors 
in South Africa. As noted earlier, the dialogue on peace and security within the SA-EU 
SP also incorporates regional bodies such as SADC.  The Kimberly Process arose in 
reaction to ‘conflict diamond’ sales, and established a means by which to track the 
origin of diamonds and regulate their sales on legal commercial markets 7 .  The 
connection between the events in Zimbabwe, Harare’s relations with South Africa, and 
South Africa’s relations with the EU and the KP are of considerable importance to 
peace and security in the SP; the KP’s progress and Zimbabwe’s political stability are 
intimately connected over the controversial Marange mines.8  
 
South Africa’s peace and security outlook: Continuity and transformation 
 
South Africa’s peace and security orientation and engagement has faced significant 
challenges since 1994 and the first democratically elected government under former 
President Nelson Mandela. Since then, it has sometimes been criticised as inconsistent9, 
schizophrenic 10 , or as putting short-term interests or gains before longer-term 
perspectives or interests. South Africa’s peace and security outlook, however, first and 
foremost has always acknowledged its interconnected geographical context within 
Southern Africa, Africa, and the global ‘South’.11  
South Africa has further consistently acknowledged in its foreign policy that there can 
be no internal stability without external stability, beginning with its nearest (regional) 
neighbours, and extending outwards.12 Its peace and security foreign policy concerns 
are therefore recognised to be embedded within its generalised foreign policy 
conceptualisation and engagement. This external dimension, which is distinguished 
from its internal security/defence perception, has focused on extending peace, stability, 
and development in Africa, and includes an active interest in the promotion of 
democratisation and human rights as a necessary component.13 
5 
 
Over the past ten years there has been a shift in orientation within South African foreign 
policy.  South Africa’s alignment with the originally identified values of the EU-SA SP 
has changed to one where its African Agenda, the idea of which gained greater 
prominence under  President Mbeki’s tenure and his vision for an African renaissance, 
has become more strategically important, especially as it relates to peace and security 
in the EU-SA SP.14 While Pretoria’s prioritising African solidarity over and above other 
partnerships could be identified as a possible ‘deal breaker’, it is in fact mutually 
beneficial and hence of strategic value to both the EU and South Africa, especially in 
relation to peace and security matters.15 
South Africa’s foreign policy under President Nelson Mandela, and hence its peace and 
security outlook, was identified as a ‘human rights’ foreign policy,16 which was born 
out of South Africa’s particular historical evolutionary path, and the necessity of 
negotiating its way out of a potentially violent transition to one of peace, reconciliation 
and negotiation. These latter aspects – reconciliation and negotiation –  set South 
Africa’s character and approach towards peace and security under Mandela, shaping its 
foreign policy tone in Africa and globally, and led to Pretoria’s role as a norm 
entrepreneur and peacemaker on the continent.17 Although not without hiccups, this 
period was also responsible for building on South Africa’s strategic capital in the area 
of peace and security, something that is well recognised by the EU18 and used to mutual 
advantage in the EU-SA SP.19 
Under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s peace and security orientation shifted. 
The example of Mandela’s international condemnation of Nigeria on the execution of  
Ken Saro-Wiwo and the Ogoni eight has often been cited as a lesson learned in how 
not to act without the consensus of African states. 20  Mandela’s ‘megaphone’ 21 
diplomacy contrasted sharply with Mbeki’s own brand of quiet22 diplomacy that ensued. 
Described as a behind-the-scenes bargaining strategy, quiet diplomacy is the most 
notable outcome of this shift in orientation, used over the course of the EU-SA peace 
and security collaboration in conjunction with Zimbabwe up until Mbeki’s ‘recall’ in 
200823. While quiet diplomacy had been widely criticised, it can be credited for laying 
the groundwork for the African Agenda and a pattern of seeking alignment, leading to 
closer relationships with South Africa’s nearest neighbours, and at the same time 
assuring other African states of Pretoria’s commitment to honour sovereignty first. 
South Africa since then has at times attempted to carve out a leadership role in peace 
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and security on the continent, but more often than not has acted in concert with other 
African countries either through the AU or regional organisations, or in smaller groups 
on peace and security matters.24 This has become more overt in President Jacob Zuma’s 
later years, in particular post-2013. 
At the beginning of the EU-SA SP the two parties  were on   equal terms regarding 
peace and security, to the extent that in the second summit meeting, the European crisis 
in Kosovo was discussed along with other areas in Africa (including Zimbabwe) 
experiencing conflict at the time. This at the very least shows the willingness to act as 
partners, and not just discuss issues that affect Africa but to assist each other in 
confronting issues based externally to Africa, in this case in Europe.25 
The ways in which South Africa has determined to achieve its peace and security goals, 
according to the 2011 DIRCO white paper entitled, A Better World: the Diplomacy of 
Ubuntu, arise from its firm belief in sovereignty and non-interference as a basis of 
interaction in peace and security situations.  South Africa at the same time shows a 
strong commitment to play a robust role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-
building, and post-conflict reconstruction.26 
A Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu outlines South Africa’s values as equality, 
democracy, and human rights.27 These are values embedded in a long-term vision that 
acknowledges South Africa’s geographical vulnerabilities and its strengths, along with 
the necessity of an interdependent peace and security strategy. 
South Africa’s emphasis has changed, however, over the successive governments since 
1994, and in the process of integration into the global environment and lessons learned. 
It would now appear that South Africa’s engagement with the rest of the world is 
viewed through the prism of its relationship to Africa. Both South Africa in Africa, and 
the African Agenda of renewal28 are considered of greater importance than its relations 
in peace and security delivery with Western partners.29 The anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist narratives still loom large in the subconscious collective of African people 
and have more recently gained prominence in South Africa.30 
While this contextual background has apparently caused some discomfort for its EU 
partner31 , South Africa seems to believe that this should not hinder business as usual 
in the relationship, especially where trade and other economic advantages are affected. 
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While South Africa seeks preferential recognition from the EU, however, it is against 
the backdrop and open acknowledgment that South Africa’s position on the continent 
is fundamentally strategic to EU interests, especially where peace and security matters 
are concerned. 
An important constraint to note nonetheless is, irrespective of whether either side’s 
interests or goals have changed over the period since the partnership came into being 
with the JAP 2007, the founding document has not. It is unreasonable to assume that 
successive governments would not try to realign themselves with the outside world in 
an attempt to keep South Africa relevant and structurally buoyant. The joint action plan 
between the EU and South Africa has acted as an upper limit on the extent to which 
both may act. However, the values that are outlined above, most pertinently the 
promotion of human rights, are quite open to interpretation and remain flexible.32 Their 
contestation has become a matter of political influence and will within the boundaries 
of the JAP provisions on peace and security in the SP. 
While South Africa’s core values, interests, and foreign policy goals have not  changed, 
it is here argued that Pretoria’s perception of them has: With changes in leadership and 
in response to the external changes that have occurred in the international arena, 
particularly in Africa and its increased turn towards its African Agenda, South Africa  
and other African states are beginning to question the interpretation and hence ‘content’ 
of these values. 
The conceptualisation of human rights, for instance, in the international context as 
conceived by the first democratically elected government led by Nelson Mandela, has 
evolved under South Africa’s subsequent leadership in Africa.  It has been influenced 
by Pretoria’s relations with emerging powers, hence its emphasis has been subsumed 
under the African Agenda, now the main tableau on which the South African foreign 
policy stands.33 Moreover, there are grounds to assert, as Zondi proposes, that there is 
not ‘one overriding conception of human rights’ in South Africa due to societal dualities 
inherited from the apartheid regime.34 
	
A (strategic) peace and security partnership 
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As a partnership, it would be presumptuous to assume that either side’s interests, and 
therefore the understanding of what is meant by ‘strategic value’, can be discussed in 
isolation from the other. In addition, over the course of the summit meetings that have 
taken place between 2008-2013, the language of the partnership has been sufficiently 
collegial to support this observation, warranting claims of such a mutual approach. 
Indeed the wording of the summit joint communiqués or declarations are based on 
either ‘agreeing’, ‘urging’ or ‘supporting calls for’ positions on whichever topics were 
discussed. While in some cases ‘agreeing’ led to the establishment of further dialogues 
or technical assistance, such as those on migration or human rights, this was rare. Most 
areas of peace and security discussed at the summits were focussed on finding ‘common 
ground’ or agreeing on a joint position (for example that the situation in Syria was of 
‘concern’).35   
Before this latter aspect is dismissed as superficial however, it should be noted that 
high-level political dialogue of this kind is crucial to the value of the SP; getting other 
‘strategic’ states to ‘agree’ on areas of peace and security, to the point that they become 
of ‘mutual interest’, is key to maintaining the strategic element within wider 
international relations. These meetings act as an important preparatory phase prior to 
‘higher’ and larger multilateral fora. Knowing how other countries will vote on peace 
and security issues, and being able to trust them to vote according to mutual interests, 
is of highest value. This is on the one hand perhaps why the EU states reacted in the 
way they did to South Africa’s voting behaviour and subsequent turn-around on Libya 
(as discussed below), casting South Africa as a ‘flip-flopper’. Casting South Africa as 
unpredictable, however, indirectly raises the stakes for success or failure thereby 
increasing the ‘strategic capital’ of the SP.  
EU-SA SP discussions of peace and security have focused on the complementary roles 
that South Africa – as an African country strategically placed in this respect – and the 
EU – as a financial and normative ally – can provide. In this sense peace and security 
have clearly meant the same thing to both sides, identified by the subject matter covered 
and discussed under that heading in the summits and in the JAP.  
Converging values and interests are outlined in the JAP on the issue of security and 
development as follows:  
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‘A key element of the Strategic Partnership is the common commitment to promoting 
an agenda of liberty, peace, security and stability in the world, and in Africa in 
particular. South African and the EU shared the understanding that security and 
development are interdependent…’36  
Under these conditions, the sections of the JAP and the agreement establishing the 
strategic partnership that fall under ‘Development Cooperation’ (Title IV of the TDCA) 
clearly become part of the peace and security/development nexus. This is supported by 
the emphasis placed on these areas of cooperation over the years.37 
The values and interests declared to be shared in the JAP form the basis for judging 
South Africa’s behaviour, and provide a measure for the apparent divergence from 
these values and interests more recently.38 These include the values of liberty, peace 
and security, equality, democracy, human rights, good governance, tolerance and 
respect for rule of law, together with a belief in:  
‘…rules-based multilateralism, the primacy of the UN in global security 
matters, sustainable development, the basic economic principles of a social 
market economy, free and fair trade and equitable international economic 
order..’39 
The contentious issues that have arisen over the past ten years challenge the notion of 
shared values such as democracy (as in Zimbabwe), rules-based multilateralism (such 
as in the cases of the ICC and the UN), the defence of human rights (as in Zimbabwe 
and the Sudan, involving the ICC), and humanitarian intervention (as in Libya).  
	
Contestation and values in the EU SA SP: Three cases 
 
With the following three cases, concerns around human rights have found their way 
into the peace and security relationship in the EU-SA SP, with all three cases 
overlapping in the political dialogue represented in the summit joint communiqués.   
 
Libya: Collaboration over confrontation and the spirit of African solidarity (2011) 
10 
 
The furore that surrounded South Africa’s voting behaviour on ‘intervention’40 in Libya 
in March 2011, focussed mainly on South Africa’s ‘flip-flopping’ on its decision within 
the UNSC, described on a continuum ranging from inconsistent to schizophrenic41. This 
was in response to South Africa determining that the subsequent intervention was not 
what it had understood would be the outcome of voting for a no-fly zone over Tripoli, 
as described in UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973.42  
In remarks made by Herman von Rompuy, European Council President after the EU-
South Africa Summit in 2011, the EU position on Libya post-intervention ‘was 
explained’ to South Africa.43 Under the contextual circumstances, this reference does 
appear paternalistic in tone. There is no other mention of what is sometimes referred to 
as ‘the blunder,’44 over the course of the ensuing Summit Joint Communiqués.  
South Africa’s apparent ‘failure’ to present a coherent face at the UNSC is based largely 
on this occasion, even though in South Africa’s voting history over the period of its 
tenure as a non-permanent member, on only a few occasions were Pretoria’s votes 
called into question. 45  For the EU, the inability to trust or guarantee Africa’s 
cooperation appeared to be a major betrayal of the strategic partnership, as expressed 
in the peace and security dialogue. 
The kind of backlash that South Africa received, could be construed as an attempt to 
marginalise it, as indeed South Africa’s behaviour was modified after the Libya vote; 
Pretoria subsequently took a submissive position over Syria, preferring to abstain from 
voting on resolutions calling for similar interventions, along with its counterparts in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group.46  
Just prior to the vote on UNSC resolution 1973, however, an AU panel consisting of 
South Africa, Mauritania, Mali, Uganda, and DRC had already taken steps towards 
addressing a mediated solution. 47  After South Africa had voted in favour of the 
infamous resolution, the panel members were informed that should they wish to return 
to Tripoli during the ensuing no-fly zone enforcement, their safety could not be 
guaranteed. 48   
For its role in voting for resolution 1973, South Africa was lambasted in African circles 
for betraying the ideals of African solidarity.49  
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Nonetheless, South Africa’s ability to declare its ‘mistakes’ in light of ensuing 
circumstances points to a willingness to stand side-by-side with its African peers in the 
last instance, in spite of the ridicule it received in international spheres for having 
changed its position50. In short, South Africa displayed an ability to react to changing 
conditions, what might be termed ‘responsive dynamism’ in its peace and security 
foreign policy.   
South Africa’s position on Libya, however, points to the overwhelmingly unquestioned 
acceptance of ‘military humanitarianism,’ 51  and the set of assumptions 52  that 
accompany it in international peacekeeping that some countries in Africa, including 
South Africa, are beginning to articulate against53. In this particular case, South Africa 
was unfortunately unable to successfully manage public understanding behind this 
highly politicised issue. Overall, conveying the full story behind the Libya vote became 
hampered by exclusive focus and coverage of South Africa’s unreliability in 
conforming to the accepted mode of human rights understandings and intervention as 
put forward by its Security Council peers. 
Based on interviews focused on the strategic partnership, for the EU the original 
‘agreement’ of 2007 formed the basis of evaluating its successive relationship and 
partnership. When unhappy with South African foreign policy decisions for example, 
it was to this original agreement and the ‘shared values’ that the EU would refer their 
South African counterparts. Even as the caveat ‘we don’t have to agree on everything’ 
became a rhetorical safety-valve54 to allow for continued collaboration and flexibility 
between both the EU and South Africa on matters of trade, finance and technical 
assistance, the original JAP of 2007 has remained a fixed reference point for 
highlighting any apparent divergence from the original values outlined therein.  
Specifically, these values have included human rights and democracy55. It is unrealistic, 
if not unreasonable in light of the various social, economic, and political challenges that 
South Africa in Africa has faced over the past ten years, for the interpretation of these 
values to remain uncontested.  
It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that in other situations and parts of the world, the 
EU has appeared to ignore infringements of human rights violations in pursuit of what 
it considered higher stake interests56 such as the suppression of opposition Islamist57 
parties in North Africa, seen to be anti-West. Human rights for the EU in that 
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geographical area at that time were therefore of negligible import compared to other 
interests. Interestingly, over the course of the EU-SA SP, dialogue on human rights has 
been pressed for by South Africa and somewhat stalled by the EU.58 
The consideration of human rights and their meaning in light of the emerging African 
Agenda have tested the boundaries of cooperation in the peace and security sector of 
the EU-SA SP, but have not yet broken them. However, human rights may well become 
more prominent in African international relations as a defining feature of the world it 
intends to create, and therefore within the SP. 
South Africa’s vote for UNSC resolution 1973 and the resulting fallout from other 
African states demonstrates the difficulty in treading the path between South Africa’s 
role as African leader-state and as African state. The balance between the two however, 
adds to the strategic capital both in peace and security roles and the overall SP. South 
Africa’s behaviour in this example points to Pretoria’s attempt to maximise its role in 
peace and security, and pursue an effective resolution to the crisis in Libya, using all 
the ‘tools’ available at the international and continental level; South Africa actively 
pursued collaboration and mediation efforts in concert with other African leaders at the 
AU level, before casting its vote in the UNSC.  
 
Zimbabwe (2013) 
From the perspective of the summits and the SP, South Africa’s stance on Zimbabwe 
over the course of the partnership’s lifetime has predominantly been one of non-
interference; ‘let the Zimbabwean people decide’.59  
In 2007, at the same time as the EU-SA SP launch, President Thabo Mbeki was 
appointed lead facilitator on Zimbabwe. By 2009, this role had been taken over by 
President Jacob Zuma. 
In the years of monitoring Harare’s 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA), South 
Africa has had to walk a tightrope between a regional and national persona: the EU-
SA-SADC-Zimbabwe nexus has created a complex set of dynamics that has proven 
challenging to navigate, yet the SP has remained intact as a valuable conduit through 
which these dynamics can play out. For the SP, the management of Zimbabwe as a 
peace and security matter, in relation to Southern Africa has been of mutual interest.60 
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Zimbabwe is furthermore a key political component in the African arena, and as such 
remains central to any peace and security interests and cooperation between South 
Africa and the EU.  
Little progress had been made on the GPA by 2010, to the extent that a list of 
outstanding issues was highlighted by the SADC committee responsible for oversight. 
By way of drawing attention away from these issues, President Robert Mugabe pressed 
for fresh elections, believing that the opposition parties had lost ground and that 
elections could proceed even without a new constitution having been finalised. South 
Africa at this point ‘lobbied’ the AU for support against holding elections in 2011, as 
Mugabe called for.  This marked a significant departure from the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of 
previous years, signifying South Africa’s readiness to critically assess the situation in 
conjunction with SADC and to carve out an alternative position from that of Mugabe’s 
ZANU-PF government. At the same time, however, the South Africa-Zimbabwe Joint 
Permanent Commission on Defence and Security called on the EU and the US to lift 
targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe,61 creating a bargaining environment between South 
Africa/Zimbabwe, on the one side and the EU/SADC on the other.  
Towards the end of 2010, opposition parties in Zimbabwe (MDC-T and MDC-M) 
petitioned SADC and the AU to intervene in the process, fearful of further escalations 
of violence and intimidation by ZANU-PF.62 At this time, ZANU-PF launched its 
National Anti-Sanctions Campaign, linking it to the ‘Indigenization Strategy’.63 In 
2011, and as a result of an internal report ‘tabled’64 by South Africa before the SADC’s 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the SADC Troika (Zambia, 
Namibia, and Mozambique) issued a strong statement on the delays in implementing 
the GPA as well as recommendations for its subsequent advancement, which included 
a monitoring team consisting of officials joining the facilitation team still led by South 
Africa.65  
This again marked a significant break in what the Mugabe-led Zimbabwean 
government had relied upon up until then: the ‘capital’ of regional solidarity. This was 
noted in the type and degree of backlash in the Zimbabwean press, which included 
personal attacks on President Zuma,66 as well as a call for a vote of no-confidence in 
South Africa’s decision to back UNSCR 1973 on Libya, already a source of foreign 
policy controversy outlined above. The rhetoric was couched in terms of betrayal of 
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African unity and solidarity.67 This was followed later, however, by an about turn by 
President Robert Mugabe and support of the SADC Troika’s recommendation. 68 
Throughout most of the lifetime of the EU-SA Joint Summitry, South Africa’s role in 
leading the SADC facilitation team, together with SADC, has been praised. In Herman 
van Rompuy’s remarks noted above at the 2011 Summit, President Zuma’s ‘personal 
engagement’ in Zimbabwe was acknowledged, as was the progress made in the face of 
challenges encountered.69 
These dynamics may be a consideration within the relationship between the EU-SA-
Zimbabwe and the parameters of the SP, where South Africa plays the role of interested 
party. 
The KP, arguably a human rights driven process,70 has been used within the context of 
the Zimbabwe-SA-EU peace and security nexus as a pivotal bargaining tool. Kept 
separate from summitry, the KP has formed an area of increased dialogue under the 
TDCA-F. Zimbabwe was suspended from the KP in 2009, and in 2010 a report was 
published that established diamond revenues from the Marange mines were being used 
to shore up Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime. 71  In 2011, the same year that 
Zimbabwe was re-admitted to the KP, Global Witness (the non-governmental 
organisation instrumental in setting up the KP) withdrew in protest. 
In 2012, however, the EU was once more positive in its acknowledgement towards 
South Africa, crediting its role in helping the EU to decide to ‘relax its targeted 
measures’ against Zimbabwean individuals and companies that were initiated in 
response to violence after the elections held in 2002.72 The suspension of the KP’s 
requirements to serve the ‘higher politics’ of the Zimbabwe-SA-EU peace and security 
dynamics further indicates that human rights had become a political tool in a wider 
context within the peace and security area of the partnership. Human rights, highly 
prized by the EU as central to democracy, rule of law, liberty and peace, were in this 
instance ignored. The EU chose to use neither its membership of the SP nor the KP to 
apply pressure to conform, but instead praised South Africa’s efforts and continued 
dialogue and summitry as usual. 
At the time of the last Summit held in 2013, the dialogue between the EU and South 
Africa appeared on paper to be cordial, their views on the pending Zimbabwean 
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elections were exchanged, and the outcomes of the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC 
Heads of State and Government (June, 2013) and its recommendations were noted. 
These included media reform, upholding the rule of law, the role of the Joint Monitoring 
and Implementation Committee, the validity of the Electoral Regulations and noting 
that SADC Observers needed to be present.73 As the summit reached its conclusion 
prior to the elections, no further comment on the elections of July in the same year were 
registered. It is widely acknowledged however, that these elections were far from ‘free 
and fair’.74 
In 2014, however, it is significant that Robert Mugabe became chair of the SADC, the 
year after elections in Zimbabwe were declared a landslide in his party’s re-election, 
the MDC-T having withdrawn in protest. It was also the same time that South Africa 
took over the Chair of the Kimberley Process, and its reform. 
By the time of the EU-Africa Summit of 2014, the relationship between South Africa 
and the EU was under increasing pressure due to the ‘triangulated’ dynamics between 
Zimbabwe and SA, on the one hand, and the EU and AU on the other. Although 
targeted75 sanctions against Zimbabwe had been lifted the year before, and Robert 
Mugabe was due to attend the Summit in Brussels, his wife Grace Mugabe was refused 
a visa to attend. In addition, Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, under indictment by the 
ICC, had not been invited to attend. In view of this, Robert Mugabe called for African 
leaders to boycott the AU Summit76, and Jacob Zuma applauded the call, consequently 
informing the local press77 that it was not for the EU to choose ‘who must come and 
who must not come’.78 Zuma was signalling a return to African solidarity that happened 
to coincide with South Africa’s own election year. 
Such a gesture at the EU-Africa Summit was highly symbolic, especially at the 
continental level where the following year (2015), Zimbabwe was in line to take over 
the chair of the AU. The gesture, while on the surface appearing to be designed to 
irritate the EU and at the same time demonstrate Southern African solidarity, did not 
have much of an effect on either the summit or the strategic partnership overall: most 
other African leaders did attend, and South Africa was in fact represented by the 
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation.79 This behaviour, however, added 
to the strategic value and tightening of peace and security stakes within the partnership 
for both the EU and South Africa, where the SA-Zimbabwe relationship is a key 
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structural component in peace and security in Southern Africa, and by weight of their 
combined liberation struggle profiles, Zimbabwe and South Africa are together a key 
component in African peace and security. 
South Africa’s position in the EU-SA-SADC-Zimbabwe nexus has been a difficult one, 
managed with strategic clarity.  Pretoria has tread the tightrope between the differing 
roles in multilateral, bilateral, regional, national, and regional international (the EU) 
scales. It has in spite of this managed to retain its strategic position through balancing 
its position between the EU and Zimbabwe, and has in fact increased its strategic capital 
in the EU-SA partnership as a result, something shown by the trade and development 
cooperation that is still maintained. At the same time, South Africa as an African state 
has shown its commitment to a longer-term perspective of its stated African Agenda. 
Sudan, Omar Hassan Al Bashir, and the ICC (2015) 
From the start of the summits in 2008 through to 2012, South Africa and the EU 
appeared to have no misunderstanding between them regarding Sudan’s impunity in 
reference to the ICC.80 Both sides appeared to agree that the situation was ‘grave’, and 
that South Africa’s mediation efforts had been of immeasurable value. At numerous 
times over the course of the ensuing summits, South Africa and, in particular, former 
President Thabo Mbeki’s AU High Level Panel (AUHLP), was praised for its 
mediation efforts.81 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s attendance at the AU summit hosted by South 
Africa in 2015 caused much consternation in South Africa domestically at the time, to 
the point that some referred to ‘a constitutional crisis’.82 Ignorance of international law 
and South Africa’s obligations under that law, together with aggressive news coverage, 
resulted in a berating of the South African government for not arresting the Sudanese 
leader. South Africa was accused of pandering to war criminals rather than the more 
legitimate and comparatively civilised West, and the ICC, of which South Africa is a 
founding signatory.  
That this situation occurred at all does not mean that South Africa harbours any 
inclination to turn its back on partnerships with the ‘West’: it has already reiterated that 
it values these, as it does the EU-SA Strategic Partnership as a whole.83 It certainly does 
mean that the African Agenda has become more prominent, and hence of greater import 
in South Africa’s foreign policy and peace and security considerations. It would 
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therefore be foolish if the EU and its Western partners were to ignore this when 
interacting with South Africa on peace and security issues. 
Whichever turns out to be accepted, the ICC has become a highly contentious issue for 
South Africa, which is in turn a contentious issue within its agenda for Africa, and this 
could in the future create a serious disjuncture within the peace and security cooperation 
under the partnership, if allowed to. 
South Africa maintains that human rights as a set of values will remain central to what 
and who South Africa is.84  Grounds for contestation have nominally focussed on 
whether African understandings of human rights differ from those in the West. There 
are also grounds on which to claim that the human rights discourse has been hijacked 
by a particular focus on individual rights, rather than applied to collective rights that 
would be more in line with African communitarianism and the concept of ‘ubuntu85’. 
South Africa poses the question as to whether at the international level, the human 
rights framework has been used politically, as justification for external interference or 
‘regime change’, something that goes against the principles of the AU constitutive Act 
of 2001 which upholds sovereignty and undemocratic changes in government.86	
	
Conclusion 
This article has focussed on the external dimension of peace and security collaboration 
through the EU-SA Strategic Partnership. That collaboration was built and exploited 
for the pursuit of South Africa’s own African Agenda (a foreign policy perspective and 
outlook), as well as its moral legacy as mediator, and its reconciliatory identity.  
The JAP of 2007 was used as a departure point for establishing the framework of the 
partnership, including those shared values and objectives that have subsequently been 
called into question, and used to varying degree to challenge the parameters of 
collaboration. Human rights, together with the other values outlined in the SP, are open 
to interpretation, and while this may appear a threat to the partnership, the flexibility of 
interpretation may actually prove to be the SP’s saving grace, allowing it to mature into 
a more equitable partnership. The EU’s expectation that the SP will deliver 
predictability in South Africa’s behaviour on peace and security matters is an indication 
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that the partnership is not yet on the basis of equality: EU, it is here argued, has yet to 
be respectful of South Africa’s separate African identity. 
In addition, areas identified as involving peace and security under the TDCA-F 
(dialogue) were also taken into consideration. The Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe, 
Libya and South Africa’s voting behaviour at the UN, and al-Bashir and the ICC,  are 
issue areas that created dynamics of contestation and tested the boundaries of peace and 
security collaboration in the SP overall. 
The nature of peace and security cooperation in the SP has been to focus on South 
Africa’s peace broker identity established under former President Nelson Mandela, 
which has continued to varying degree under subsequent governments, albeit with 
different emphases and success, mainly due to developing challenges encountered in 
relation to the increasing complexity and new roles that South Africa has found itself 
in. This identity has been used strategically by both the EU and South Africa, and 
amplified through South Africa’s membership of the SADC and the AU to relative 
success. 
South Africa has consistently stressed its preference for non-interference, allowing the 
people of African states to decide their own fates, and also its preference for cooperation 
over competition, and collaboration over confrontation. Within the context of the 
strategic partnership, European states and the EU need to take these factors into 
consideration; these issues, values, and interests have formed the basis of a long term 
perspective of the EU’s role in Africa, and how this will be of longer-term benefit to 
South Africa, its neighbours, and inevitably those partners with whom it enters into 
agreements. Short-term interests or politicking can become tactics in a long-term 
strategy. 
South Africa and the EU’s perception of what constitutes peace and security within the 
partnership has remained largely the same. However, how to deliver peace and security 
to Africa, and how to strategise its own role within the partnership as it relates to its 
regional and continental peers, has not. 
South Africa has maintained the same values, especially those that pertain to humanity 
(human rights), yet has begun to question their particular interpretation from external 
sources and contest their application: it is evident from the three cases examined that 
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the nature of human rights, the trend towards the militarisation of humanitarianism and 
the subsuming of these as ‘universals’ applicable in all circumstances, have become 
elevated to political issues in Africa.  
The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe has indeed been an extraordinary 
one. The ‘special’ handling of the EU-Zimbabwe may, from the outside, have seemed 
contradictory. As a key component of Southern Africa, this relationship has shaped the 
SP.  
On the surface, criticism of South Africa’s apparent divergence from the initial interests 
and values outlined in the JAP of 2007 could be construed as unfair, especially in a 
world that accepts the nature of globalisation and complex international relations, as 
these aspects must also accept the incumbent dynamism that goes hand in hand with 
change. In the context of South Africa’s future engagement with the EU, the 
continuation of an adaptive foreign policy of this kind would mean a much more 
unpredictable partner. The strict hitherto understanding of a ‘strategic partner’ by the 
EU, would be openly relaxed. This is, as this article has demonstrated in the continued 
functionality of the SP, the case. What remains is the extent to which the SP’s values 
are called to account or politicised by either side. It may well be that a foreign peace 
and security policy that is flexible and able to adapt, may have greater use in the long 
term when the complexity of globalised relations is truly accepted. 
Note on contributor:  Lara Hierro is a post doctoral research fellow with the SARChI 
in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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